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Abstract
Background: Recent international and national events have brought critical attention to the
Canadian public health system and how prepared the system is to respond to various types of
contemporary public health threats. This article describes the study design and methods being used
to conduct a systems-level analysis of public health preparedness in the province of Alberta,
Canada. The project is being funded under the Health Research Fund, Alberta Heritage Foundation
for Medical Research.
Methods/Design: We use an embedded, multiple-case study design, integrating qualitative and
quantitative methods to measure empirically the degree of inter-organizational coordination
existing among public health agencies in Alberta, Canada. We situate our measures of inter-
organizational network ties within a systems-level framework to assess the relative influence of
inter-organizational ties, individual organizational attributes, and institutional environmental
features on public health preparedness. The relative contribution of each component is examined
for two potential public health threats: pandemic influenza and West Nile virus.
Discussion: The organizational dimensions of public health preparedness depend on a complex
mix of individual organizational characteristics, inter-agency relationships, and institutional
environmental factors. Our study is designed to discriminate among these different system
components and assess the independent influence of each on the other, as well as the overall level
of public health preparedness in Alberta. While all agree that competent organizations and
functioning networks are important components of public health preparedness, this study is one of
the first to use formal network analysis to study the role of inter-agency networks in the
development of prepared public health systems.
Background
International and national events have brought critical
attention to the Canadian public health system and how
prepared the system is to respond to various types of con-
temporary public health threats. Whether those threats
result from emerging infectious diseases or bioterrorism,
the public health system is responsible for protecting the
health of the population. Outbreak response occurs first
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at the local or regional levels and thus the potential
impact that a threat will have on the overall Canadian
population can differ significantly depending on the
capacity of public health systems to respond[1]. For exam-
ple, following the SARS outbreak in Toronto, the Cana-
dian National Advisory Committee (NAC) on SARS and
Public Health held it as fortunate that the SARS outbreak
struck primarily in Toronto and not in other parts of Can-
ada where the capacity to combat public health threats is
limited[2]. While a "general renewal of the public health
infrastructure" and its capacity to respond are in order the
effective coordination of all agencies at regional, provin-
cial, and federal levels is necessary to assure a comprehen-
sive surveillance and management of public health
threats. As Ralph Klein, the Premier of Alberta, com-
mented: "Albertans and all Canadians understand a dis-
ease outbreak like SARS or West Nile virus in one region
affects other parts of the country. Coordinated approaches
will help deal with public health threats."
Despite the commitment of federal and provincial agen-
cies in Canada to improve public health system perform-
ance and develop overall public health preparedness, little
is still known about the current systems-level state of pub-
lic health preparedness in Canada. While coordination is
seen as a necessary element for public health prepared-
ness, few measures of inter-organizational collaboration
relevant to public health preparedness have been devel-
oped and assessed in relation to other features of the
organizational and inter-organizational environment.
This study protocol presents the premises, conceptual
model and methods used to measure and assess public
health preparedness in Alberta, Canada. Although provin-
cial public health agencies are themselves embedded
within federal and global public health preparedness sys-
tems, we focus primarily on the organizational environ-
ment of public health preparedness in Alberta so as to
develop contextually-relevant measures and evaluation
techniques as well as address issues related to potential
cross-Alberta variations in public health preparedness.
In Alberta, public health and emergency response proce-
dures are primarily governed under the Disaster Services
Act [3] and the Public Health Act[4]. Provincial response to
a public health disaster event may thus call into action
organizations and units under the jurisdiction of local
municipalities, regional health authorities, emergency
management districts, and/or the provincial government.
There are a number of organizational actors that may be
involved in preparation, response, or recovery phases of a
public health disaster, including departments or portfo-
lios within agencies. Each of which are potential actors in
the provincial public health and emergency response net-
work. While we consider the overall public health and
emergency management network to consist of all poten-
tial organizational actors involved in responding to public
health threats, the precise set of organizations that come
together around a particular public health threat depends
on the nature of that threat. For example, pandemic influ-
enza and the West Nile virus are both emerging infectious
diseases but the nature of their transmission differs and
distinctive sets of organizational actors must be in place to
confront them. In the case of West Nile Virus, Alberta's
Department of the Environment and Sustainable
Resource Development would be integrally involved for
mosquito surveillance and control whereas it would not
be as integral in the event of a pandemic influenza out-
break[5]. To assess potential differences by public health
threat in Alberta public health preparedness, we examine
and compare two potential public health threats: pan-
demic influenza and West Nile Virus.
Methods/Design
Conceptual model
Using an embedded multiple-case study design[6] and
integrated qualitative and quantitative methods, the
project proposes to measure empirically the degree of
seamless coordination existing among municipal,
regional or district-level and provincial public health and
emergency management agencies in Alberta. Although
federal authorities and agencies play an important role in
provincial-level responses to public health emergencies,
for the purposes of this research, the focus will be on the
inter-organizational linkages and organizational environ-
ments of provincial and sub-provincial actors; relevant
federal-level organizations will be identified for future
investigation. The seamless coordination of activities and
tasks that should characterize the overall federal-provin-
cial-regional linkages should also characterize the intra-
provincial linkages. Fluid communication and resource
flows among such diverse organizations and administra-
tive authorities require an integrated and coordinated net-
work of actors. Our research is premised on empirical
research that has shown that effective and coordinated
approaches to public health threats require a well-inte-
grated and responsive inter-organizational system and
that the most appropriate method in which to analyze
inter-organizational relations and the degree of integra-
tion is one based on network analysis [7]. Yet, strong
inter-organizational ties are not enough for effective pre-
paredness if the organizations involved do not have the
necessary individual capacity to respond to public health
threats. In this regard, fluid communication and inte-
grated organizational connections are but one element in
an overall systems-level approach to assessing public
health preparedness. As shown in Figure 1, we view public
health preparedness to be a product of several interrelated
factors: 1) individual organizational attributes, 2) the
inter-organizational networks existing among relevant
organizational actors, 3) the institutional environmentsBMC Public Health 2006, 6:313 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2458/6/313
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in which organizations and inter-organizational networks
are located and in which threats first emerge, and 4) the
integrated coordination of specific action-sets. An action-
set refers, in this case, to a subgroup of organizations in
the network that come together purposefully to address a
specific public health threat. We see these four factors
together influencing system-level public health prepared-
ness.
Sampling design
Our target population for the research is all public health
and emergency management-related organizations in
Alberta. The construction of the project's sampling frame
is based on a stratified, multistage cluster design. The
strata are four administrative divisions: (1) provincial-
level agencies, (2) sub-provincial administrative agencies,
i.e., emergency-management districts (disaster services)
and regional health authorities, (3) metropolitan areas,
and (4) towns and local areas. Within strata 1–3, the sam-
pling frame includes all public health or emergency man-
agement organizations, i.e., agencies, departments, or
units, within those strata. The fourth stratum will be sub-
stratified according to the Alberta Emergency Manage-
ment district divisions into 6 geographical areas: (1)
northwestern Alberta, (2) northeastern Alberta, (3) north-
central Alberta, (4) central Alberta, (5) south-central
Alberta, and (6) southern Alberta. From each of the 6 geo-
graphical regions, we will draw a proportionate, random
sub-sample of towns. For stratum 4, the sampling frame
consists of all public health or emergency management-
related organizations in those towns randomly selected.
The project's frame population will thus consist of those
organizations listed in the strata 1–3 sampling frame and
those listed in the stratum 4 sampling frame.
Phase one: initial qualitative research
This study will be conducted in 2 phases: phase 1 qualita-
tive and phase 2 quantitative research. Phase 1 is used in
part to help identify the organizations responsible for
public health and emergency responses and the relevant
relationships among them. Initial qualitative research will
consist of the analysis of official documents and reports
and interviews with key organizational representatives.
Government documents and reports will be analyzed to
1) help identify agencies involved in the response system,
2) determine the formal tasks assigned to those agencies,
and 3) initially assess the overall level of preparedness and
responsiveness for the three case studies. Interviews with
PHP Systems Conceptual Framework Figure 1
PHP Systems Conceptual Framework.
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key informants and health officials will be used to deter-
mine 1) if there are additional organizations involved in
the response system that were not noted in the official
documents, 2) the types of relationships characterizing
the inter-organizational ties within and among action-
sets, and develop 3) relevant measures of the institutional
environment and of public health preparedness and
responsiveness. While laws mandate that certain organi-
zations be involved in emergency responses to specific
public health threats, key organizational representatives
may identify agencies that play an important albeit infor-
mal role in local emergency response systems.
In addition to helping identify organizations that may be
absent from official documents, the interviews will also
investigate the perceived characteristics of inter-organiza-
tional relationships. Mandated relationships, for exam-
ple, tend to be characterized by lower levels of perceived
cooperation among organizations [8]. While such charac-
teristics will be investigated using quantitative methods in
phase 2, the qualitative research will reveal the points of
conflict and cooperation that emerge in the course of pub-
lic health and emergency responses and thus provide a
basis for the questions that will be used in the organiza-
tional questionnaire. The final focus of the phase one
interviews will centre on the development of measures of
the institutional environment, network effectiveness, and
public health preparedness. What are the resources that
key agency representatives themselves identify as critical
and important to their organization and the network?
What processes do the respondents use to evaluate if their
organization or the system was prepared?
In phase 1, we will draw a non-proportional sample from
the project's sampling frame. We will interview 6 organi-
zational representatives from the provincial level (stratum
1), 12 representatives from the sub-provincial level (strata
2 and 3), and 18 representatives from the local level (stra-
tum 4). Phase 1 interview respondents will be organiza-
tional representatives who are randomly selected from
each of these strata and choose to participate.
Interviews will be tape-recorded and transcribed so that
content analysis, thematic, and inter-textual analyses can
be conducted on the interviews. Transcripts will be coded
for such indicators as (1) organizations involved in the
public health and emergency management preparedness,
(2) types of information-sharing among organizations,
(3) types of resource flows existing among organizations,
and (4) perceptions of local and provincial public health
preparedness. Content analysis will be used to identify rel-
evant organizations that were not identified in the docu-
mentary research [9,10]. Thematic analyses will be used to
identify the critical themes emerging in the 36 interviews;
inter-textual analyses will be used to compare the
responses of interviewees across the three strata dimen-
sions of jurisdiction, domain, and geographical location.
Phase two: organizational questionnaires
Phase 2 involves the administration of an organizational/
inter-organizational questionnaire to Alberta-based pub-
lic health and emergency management agencies. Informa-
tion on organizations and inter-organizational networks
will be collected by web-based or telephone question-
naires. For phase 2, we intend to administer question-
naires to representatives of all organizations listed in the
project's sampling frame (described earlier). The ques-
tionnaire consists of three components: 1) an organiza-
tional attribute component, 2) an inter-organizational
network component, and 3) an organizational environ-
ment and network assessment component. The organiza-
tional attribute component consists of questions on the
general characteristics of organizations such as staff size,
training background of specific occupational roles in the
organization, sectoral operations, budget and more emer-
gency-response related questions, such as whether an
agency has formally assessed its epidemiology capacity.
The inter-organizational network component consists of
items that ask representatives to identify those organiza-
tions with which their own organization has ties along
specific dimensions. The specific content and dimensions
of the network to be mapped will be determined follow-
ing phase one analysis but candidate dimensions used in
other organizational network studies include (i) informa-
tion-sharing, (ii) resource-sharing, including staff and
(iii) joint-planning. For each of the critical dimensions
identified in phase one, the respondent will be presented
with a list of organizations within the relevant action-set
and asked, for each one, "who do you share information
with?" or "who do you share resources with."
The third component of the questionnaire will consist of
the respondent's subjective assessments of the institu-
tional environment and inter-organizational network,
and the impact that each has on perceived public health
preparedness. For example, how do representatives assess
the environment in which they operate, i.e., do they see
resources as easily available or scarce? How prepared do
they perceive their own organization and local system to
be for a public health threat? Since mandated relations
involve "sequential interdependence," an important ques-
tion is whether organizations perceive the task transitions
among organizations as functioning smoothly. The actual
questions that will be used in this component of the ques-
tionnaire will be determined following phase one data
analysis.
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Health Region and University of Calgary, Faculty of Med-
icine (ID#17873) and of the Capital Health Region and
University of Alberta (#B-251005).
Discussion
The capacity of any organization to be prepared for a pub-
lic health threat is influenced in part by the system in
which the organization is located, just as the preparedness
of the overall system can be influenced by the strengths
and weaknesses of any single organization. The cross-case
and intra-provincial comparative design allows our
research to discriminate among different system elements
and examine the independent influence of organizational
attributes, institutional environments, and inter-organiza-
tional networks on public health preparedness. In addi-
tion, the mixed methods approach enables our research to
analyse the role of both informal and formal relationships
in the emergence of inter-organization networks and the
development of prepared and responsive public health
systems. As far as we are aware, our project is one of the
first to assess public health preparedness at the systems-
level while accounting for the critical role that inter-organ-
izational relationships play in the emergence of a cohesive
and responsive system. Moreover, in deciphering the
independent influence of inter-organizational ties within
the overall system, the research will provide measures that
will help researchers and policy-makers evaluate the
degree of coordination among organizational actors.
Where are the gaps in system linkages? Which organiza-
tions need to be made more central to preparedness activ-
ities? These are just a few of the questions that our research
is designed to answer.
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